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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, states throughout the United States have
extended rights to same-sex couples that have been traditionally
denied.2 Among these is the right for same-sex couples to adopt chil-
dren.3 To accommodate same-sex couples, many states have allowed
second parent adoptions, adoption by married same-sex couples,
1. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 168 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Weiner, J., dissenting)
(stating in response to the offer to list one but not both parents on the birth certificate,
“I have searched the Constitution in vain for a ‘Half Faith and Credit Clause.’ ”), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
2. See Fla. Dept. of Children and Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 81
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that only Florida completely bars adoption by a homo-
sexual person, and even Florida allows a homosexual person to be a foster parent).
3. Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother?: Interstate Recognition of Adoptions
by Gays and Lesbians, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2008).
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and adoption by unmarried same-sex couples.4 However, hostility to-
wards same-sex couples adopting children still exists in many states.5
Florida, Mississippi,6 and Utah7 ban adoption by same-sex couples,
although a Florida court recently ruled the ban violated the equal pro-
tection clause of Florida’s constitution.8 Many other states prohibit
adoption by unmarried couples, which produces the same effect.9
This disparity in adoption rights creates a confusing situation
for same-sex couples with adopted children.10 One situation that is
a source of controversy occurs when same-sex couples from one state
adopt a child born in a different state and seek an amended birth cer-
tificate listing both adopted parents on the birth certificate.11 Most
states have statutory mechanisms for issuing amended birth certif-
icates to adoptive parents.12 However, some states have refused to is-
sue amended birth certificates to out-of-state adoptive parents if the
parents are a same-sex couple.13 This places families in a difficult
position, as their parental rights are seemingly subject to change
depending on which state they enter.14 The ramifications that follow
from non-recognition of parental rights can be quite serious.15
4. Id.
5. See Matter of Appeal in Pima Cnty. Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that considering an adoption applicant’s bisexuality as
evidence against allowing adoption certification is valid).
6. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2011) (“Adoption by couples of the same gen-
der is prohibited.”).
7. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2012) (“A child may not be adopted by a
person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding mar-
riage under the laws of this state.”).
8. Fla. Dept. of Children and Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010). But cf. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dept. of Children and Family Servs.,
358 F.3d. 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the ban did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the federal Constitution), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
9. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (1992) (“A single person . . . or a married
couple jointly may petition to privately adopt a child.”). Because same-sex couples cannot
marry in the vast majority of states, these statutes prevent same-sex couples from adopting.
10. Wasserman, supra note 3, at 13.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76 (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-316
(West 2010).
13. See Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. La. 2008) (There are three Adar v.
Smith cases. This case will be referred to as “Smith I ” in the main text and in the foot-
notes when short form is acceptable.), aff’d, 597 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc,
639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011); Finstuen v. Edmonson,
497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496
F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
14. Brief for Petitioner Adar as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4 Adar v. Smith,
132 S. Ct. 400 (2011) (No. 11-46), 2011 WL 3608716 (cert. denied) (“The decision . . . opens
the door to government officials potentially not recognizing parental ties established by
out-of-state adoption judgments in various other circumstances beyond issuance . . . .”).
15. E.g., id. at 5, 18–19. These ramifications can include inability to make decisions
during a medical emergency, inability to recover the child’s body upon death, and inability
to file tort actions on the child’s behalf. Id.
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Adoption decrees are judgments stemming from judicial pro-
ceedings, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution therefore controls the way states may treat them.16 Two
recent circuit court decisions conflict as to whether the Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires a state to issue a revised birth certificate
naming both adoptive parents, regardless of the fact that the adop-
tion would not have been legal if initiated in that state.17
The first decision occurred in 2007 when the Tenth Circuit held
in Finstuen v. Crutcher that “adoption orders and decrees are judg-
ments that are entitled to recognition by all other states under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.”18 The court further held that issuing
a revised birth certificate under Oklahoma birth certificate law was
“recognition” required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause and not
“enforcement.”19 The Tenth Circuit ordered that the adoptive par-
ents be awarded a revised certificate that listed both parents.20
In 2011, the Fifth Circuit decided a case under nearly identical
circumstances involving same-sex adoptive parents from New York
who were seeking a revised Louisiana birth certificate.21 The court
agreed that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did require states to
recognize adoption decrees from other states, but requiring a state to
issue a revised birth certificate was “enforcement,” not “recognition.”22
As such, Louisiana did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause by
refusing to “enforce” the judgment through issuing a revised birth
certificate.23 The court separately held that a violation of full faith and
credit could not be brought as a § 1983 action.24 Although the lower
court had not addressed the issue, the Fifth Circuit also held that de-
nying a revised birth certificate to the adoptive parents did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.25
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 3 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law,
Jurisdiction, and Judgment Issues in Interstate Adoption Cases, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 803,
804 (2003) (“[A]doption is accomplished through court proceedings, which result in judg-
ments . . . [o]nce a valid judgment is rendered in an action, the implementing statutes
to the Full Faith and Credit Clause limit the ability of the parties to the action . . . .”).
17. Compare Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (This particular
case will be referred to as “Smith III ” in the main text and in the footnotes when short
form is acceptable.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011), with Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496
F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
18. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1156.
19. Id. at 1154. The distinction between recognition and enforcement is extremely
important in determining whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies. This dis-
tinction will be discussed in detail later.
20. Id. at 1156.
21. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 149.
22. Id. at 160.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 153.
25. Id. at 162.
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This Note will discuss the jurisprudence of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and its application in both of these important cases.
After discussing each case, the Note will then explore the main con-
flicts between the two cases: whether a full faith and credit claim is
redressable using § 1983 and whether requiring states to issue re-
vised birth certificates is recognition or enforcement. Through this
analysis, the Note will argue that a § 1983 claim is a valid method to
redress full faith and credit violations and further, that states with
statutory mechanisms for issuing new birth certificates to adoptive
parents are required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize
the judgments of other states and list both names of the adoptive
parents, regardless of whether the adoption law or public policy of the
state would not have allowed the adoption in the first place. This
analysis will demonstrate that the en banc majority opinion of the
Fifth Circuit is incorrect in its holdings regarding § 1983, the differ-
ence between recognition and enforcement as applied to Smith III, and
its ultimate determination that the actions of the Louisiana Registrar
did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution reads in
part: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the pub-
lic Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” 26
The Supreme Court has described the purpose of the clause as “to
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sover-
eignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by
the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral
parts of a single nation . . . .” 27 So long as the state that issued the
judgment had jurisdiction over the parties, other states must re-
spect and give effect to the judgment.28
The Supreme Court has clarified that there is a distinction be-
tween judgments and statutes.29 A state is not bound to apply a statute
of another state but must give full faith and credit to its judgments.30
26. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 3. The Full Faith and Credit Clause was implemented
by Congress in 1790 and is currently codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
27. Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935).
28. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979).
29. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Baker v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1998)).
30. Hall, 440 U.S. at 421.
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In Baker, the Court defined this distinction by acknowledging that
there is a difference between recognizing the forum state’s judgment
and enforcing the judgment.31 The state maintains the ability to de-
termine the method by which it enforces the judgment so long as it
applies the law in an “evenhanded” manner.32 However, the state may
not refuse to recognize the judgment, even if it violates the state’s
public policy; the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not recognize a
public policy exception for judgments.33
The Supreme Court has demonstrated the difference between
recognition and enforcement when applied to out-of-state adoptions.34
In Hood, a man had adopted children in Louisiana and owned land
in Alabama.35 Upon his death, the adopted children could not inherit
his land in Alabama because Alabama law prevented children adopt-
ed out-of-state from inheriting land.36 The children sued, claiming
Alabama had violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause.37 Justice
Holmes held that Alabama had fulfilled its duty to give the judgment
full faith and credit.38 Alabama recognized the Louisiana judgment—
that the children were legally adopted—and then applied Alabama
law to enforce the judgment.39 Alabama was not required to import
Louisiana’s law, which allowed adopted children to inherit land so
long as they recognized their status as adopted children and applied
this status to Alabama law.40 Because adoptions are judgments stem-
ming from judicial proceedings, a valid adoption decree from one
state must be recognized by another regardless of public policy.41
B. The Tenth Circuit Case: Finstuen v. Crutcher
In 2002, Oklahoma-born baby “E.” was legally adopted by two
women (the “Doels”) in California.42 After moving to Oklahoma, the
31. Baker, 522 U.S. at 223–24 (“Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that
enforcement measures must travel with the sister state judgment.”).
32. Id. at 224.
33. Id. at 223 (“[T]his Court’s decisions support no roving ‘public policy exception’ to
the full faith and credit due judgments.” (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948))).
34. See Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611, 615 (1915).
35. Id. at 614.
36. Id. at 615.
37. Id. at 614.
38. Id. at 615.
39. Id.
40. Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611, 615 (1915).
41. Mark Strasser, Interstate Recognition of Adoptions: On Jurisdiction, Full Faith
and Credit, and the Kinds of Challenges the Future May Bring, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1809,
1814 (2008).
42. Finstuen v. Edmonson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d sub
nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Doels requested a revised birth certificate from the Oklahoma De-
partment of Health (ODH) that listed both of the Doels as parents.43
The ODH refused to issue a revised birth certificate, and the Okla-
homa legislature responded in kind by amending a statute to pro-
hibit Oklahoma from recognizing same-sex adoption judgments from
other states.44 The Doels sued the Oklahoma Attorney General in
federal district court, alleging that the amendment violated the Full
Faith and Credit, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution.45 The district court held that the amendment violated
the Full Faith and Credit Clause because it “impair[ed] the proper
recognition of . . . out-of-state decrees.” 46
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling
that the amendment violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause.47
Oklahoma argued that, although there was no public policy excep-
tion, requiring Oklahoma to issue a revised birth certificate was an
“impermissible, extra-territorial application of California law in
Oklahoma.” 48 The court responded that this was not an application
of California law, but simply a recognition of California’s judgment
within an Oklahoma statutory framework.49 Judge Ebel explained:
A California court made the decision . . . . That decision is final. If
Oklahoma had no statute providing for the issuance of supplemen-
tary birth certificates for adopted children, the Doels could not in-
voke the Full Faith and Credit Clause in asking Oklahoma for a
new birth certificate. However, Oklahoma has such a statute—i.e.,
it already has the necessary “mechanism [ ] for enforcing [adoption]
judgments.” The Doels merely ask Oklahoma to apply its own law
to “enforce” their adoption order in an “even-handed” manner.50
The right of the Doels to an amended birth certificate came from
Oklahoma law and its application, not California law.51
43. Id.
44. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (West 2011) (“[T]his state, any of its agen-
cies, or any court of this state shall not recognize an adoption by more than one indi-
vidual of the same sex from any other state . . . .”); Finsteun v. Edmonson, 497 F. Supp.
2d at 1300. The legislature passed the amendment in response to an Oklahoma Attorney
General Opinion stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause might require the ODH to
issue the revised birth certificate. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1142.
45. Finstuen v. Edmonson, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1300.
46. Id. at 1307.
47. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1156.
48. Id. at 1153.
49. Id. at 1153–54. Oklahoma law states that “[t]he State Registrar, upon receipt of
a certificate of a decree of adoption, shall prepare a supplementary birth certificate in
the new name of the adopted person with the names of the adoptive parents listed as the
parents.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-6.6(B) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
50. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1154 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
51. Id.
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The court concluded that the Oklahoma amendment banning
recognition of same-sex adoption decrees was unconstitutional.52 Even
without the explicit ban, Oklahoma would violate the Full Faith and
Credit Clause if it refused to issue a revised birth certificate because
it would be “denying the ‘effective operation’ of out-of-state adoption
proceedings.”53 The court did not consider the equal protection claim.54
C. Adar v. Smith
1. District Court and First Fifth Circuit Decision
In 2005, a Louisiana-born child, Infant J, was adopted by an un-
married same-sex couple in New York and issued a New York adop-
tion decree.55 The adopted parents requested a revised birth certificate
listing both parents’ names, and the Louisiana Registrar denied their
request.56 The parents brought suit in the federal Eastern District
Court of Louisiana alleging that the Registrar’s refusal to issue a birth
certificate with both their names violated the Full Faith and Credit
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.57
The district court, citing the Tenth Circuit’s Finstuen opinion
and using similar reasoning, ruled that the Registrar’s refusal was
a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.58 The court ruled
that because Louisiana’s statutes provided the mechanism for the
state to issue an amended birth certificate to out-of-state adoptive
parents, the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the provision of
a birth certificate.59
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court.60 The
court considered two issues: first, whether Louisiana owed full faith
52. Id. at 1156.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859 (E.D. La. 2008), aff’d, 597 F.3d 697 (5th
Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
56. Id. The Registrar explained that Louisiana law and public policy did not allow
naming both unmarried adoptive parents on the birth certificate.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 861–62 (“The [Registrar] . . . confuses the issues of Louisiana’s obligation . . . .
[T]here is no question that the rights granted by the adoption decree are final and enforce-
able under the full faith and credit clause.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Finstuen v.
Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1153–55 (10th Cir. 2007))).
59. Id. at 864. The relevant statute states in part “[w]hen a person born in Louisiana
is adopted in a court of proper jurisdiction in any other state . . . . [u]pon receipt of the
certified copy of the decree, the state registrar shall make a new record in its archives,
showing . . . [t]he names of the adoptive parents.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76 (2011).
60. Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2010) (This case will be referred to as
“Smith II ” in the main text and in the footnotes when the short form is acceptable.),
rev’d en banc, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 U.S. 400 (2011).
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and credit to the New York adoption decree and, if yes, whether
Louisiana’s adoption statute required the Registrar to issue an
amended birth certificate.61
Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court found that full faith
and credit did apply to out-of-state adoption decrees, the decrees must
be recognized, and there is no public policy exception.62 The court re-
jected the Registrar’s arguments and further held that the plain lan-
guage of § 40:76 mandated that the Registrar issue a revised birth
certificate once given a proper out-of-state adoption decree.63
2. Fifth Circuit Rehearing en Banc
On a rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed Smith II.64
The court made a number of holdings: first, full faith and credit
obligations could not be asserted in a § 1983 action; second, the ac-
tion should have been brought in state court; third, even if the ac-
tion were feasible, the Registrar did not deny full faith and credit to
the New York adoption decree in refusing to issue a revised birth
certificate; and finally, the Louisiana law that prohibited issuing
amended birth certificates to married couples does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.65
a. Full Faith and Credit Cannot Be Asserted in a
§ 1983 Action
The first issue the en banc panel addressed was whether a Full
Faith and Credit Clause violation is correctable in federal court with
a § 1983 action.66 Although the issue had not been addressed in the
previous decisions, the en banc panel held that it was not correct-
able.67 The court reasoned that the purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and its implementing statute was to bind judgments
from one state court to only other state and federal courts.68 The
61. Id. at 706.
62. Id. at 707–08 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998);
Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)).
63. Id. at 718 (“This interpretation avoids the Registrar’s manifestly strained and
unconstitutional attempt to go beyond the plain language of the statute.”).
64. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 147 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
400 (2011).
65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (allowing an individual to bring a cause of action for equi-
table relief against state actors for a violation of the individual’s Constitutional rights);
Smith III, 639 F.3d at 151.
67. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 151–52 (“Section 1983 has no place in the clause’s orches-
tration of inter-court comity . . . .”).
68. Id. at 151.
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court reasoned that “[t]he cases thus couple the individual right [of
having one’s judgment given full faith and credit] with the duty of
courts . . . .” 69 The court claimed that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Finstuen was the only federal case to date that supported the propo-
sition of bringing a § 1983 action for a violation of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.70 On the contrary, the court argued Supreme Court
history demonstrates that the Court “intervenes only after the state
court denies the validity of a sister state’s law or judgment.” 71 Thus,
because courts have the duty to recognize judgments, it does not
follow that individuals should be able to bring an action against
“non-judicial state actors.” 72 State officials, the court said, lack the
ability to determine “whether a judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit” so it would not make sense that an action could be brought
against them.73
The en banc panel also relied heavily on the Supreme Court case
Thompson v. Thompson.74 Thompson, the court said, showed that
Congress had not intended to involve federal courts in the adjudica-
tion of full faith and credit cases.75 Full Faith and Credit Clause vio-
lations were supposed to be brought in state courts, with final review
available by the Supreme Court.76 After reiterating that Finstuen v.
Crutcher was the only federal court that had allowed a § 1983 action
in such cases, the en banc panel concluded that full faith and credit
violations could not be addressed with a § 1983 action.77
b. The Action Should Have Been Brought in State Court
The en banc panel also held that the adoptive parents should
have pursued the action in state court because the Full Faith and
Credit Clause on its own is “insufficient to invoke federal question
jurisdiction.” 78 Once the action has been brought in state court, the
69. Id. at 154.
70. Id. at 153 (“Only one federal case [Finstuen] . . . appears to support this
proposition.”).
71. Id. at 154 (citing Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458, 465 (1905); Johnson v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 491, 495 (1903); Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 108 U.S.
18, 18 (1883)).
72. Id. (“Such cases begin in state court, and the Supreme Court intervenes only after
the state court denies the validity of a sister state’s law or judgment.”).
73. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 155.
74. Id. at 155–56 (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988)).
75. Id. at 156.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 157. The en banc panel declared that Finstuen had “granted relief under
§ 1983.” Curiously though, Finstuen never actually mentions § 1983. Finstuen v. Crutcher,
496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007).
78. Id.
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court stated that only then could the action be reviewable in federal
court, and even then only by the Supreme Court.79
c. Issuing a New Birth Certificate Is Enforcement,
Not Recognition
After holding that the adoptive parents did not have a right to
initially bring the action in federal court, the en banc panel held
that even assuming they did, the Registrar did not violate the Full
Faith and Credit Clause by denying the parents an amended birth
certificate with both parents’ names listed.80
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that full faith and
credit is owed to judgments issued by sister states, but a distinction
exists between “recognition” and “enforcement” of these judgments.81
The court continued that the Registrar had fully recognized the adop-
tive parents’ status and, therefore, the issue could not be relitigated
in Louisiana.82 However, forcing the Registrar to list both parents
on the birth certificate was enforcement, not recognition.83 Although
Louisiana must recognize New York’s judgment, Louisiana law “de-
termines what incidental property rights flow from a validly recog-
nized judgment.” 84
After discussing Hood, the court reasoned that the facts in
Smith III were analogous; Louisiana law prohibits listing two un-
married adoptive parents on a Louisiana birth certificate.85 Because
Louisiana law determines the rights of adoptive parents, the unmar-
ried adoptive parents are not entitled to a revised birth certificate
with both parents’ names listed.86 The Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not force the sister state to substitute its own statute for that
of the forum state.87 The court concluded that because Louisiana
does not allow the issuance of this type of birth certificate, no right
under Louisiana law was being denied to the adoptive parents, and
thus there was no full faith and credit violation.88
79. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 158.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 158–59 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp, 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998)).
82. Id. at 159.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Smith III, 639 F.3d. at 159–60 (citing Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915)).
86. Id. at 160 (“Louisiana can be described as the ‘sole mistress’ of revised birth
certificates . . . [and] has every right to channel and direct the rights created by foreign
judgments.” (quoting Hood, 237 U.S. at 615)).
87. Id. at 160 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (quoting Pac.
Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939))).
88. Id. at 161.
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d. The Registrar’s Action Did Not Violate the Equal
Protection Clause
Finally, a more divided court89 concluded that the Registrar’s
action did not deny the parents equal protection under the law.90 The
majority held that adopted children of unmarried parents did not
represent a suspect class, and rational basis review was the appro-
priate standard.91 Judge Jones reasoned that “Louisiana has ‘a le-
gitimate interest in encouraging a stable and nurturing environment
for . . . its adopted children.’ ” 92 The court cited a study suggesting that
child development improved when children were raised by married
couples.93 For the court, this study demonstrated that the Louisiana
law was rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest.94 Thus,
the parents did not have a valid claim under equal protection.95
3. Concurring Opinions
Three concurring opinions were filed in Smith III.96 Judge
Reavley’s concurring opinion took no issue with the majority opinion
but simply expressed disappointment with the dissent.97 In their
separate concurring opinions, Judges Southwick and Haynes took
issue with the majority’s decision to address the parents’ equal pro-
tection claim.98 Both judges agreed that the usual practice of appellate
courts is to refrain from deciding an issue that has not been addressed
by the lower trial court.99 As such, they argued that the majority opin-
ion should not have addressed the equal protection claims.100
89. The case was heard by a sixteen member en banc panel of judges. Eleven judges
joined the majority opinion in its analysis and judgment regarding the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. However, only nine judges joined the majority in its analysis of equal
protection, with seven judges agreeing that the majority should not have addressed the
equal protection claim. Id. at 147.
90. Id. at 161.
91. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 162.
92. Id. (quoting Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804, 819 (11th Cir. 2004)).
93. Id. (citing Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Child’s Perspective:
How Does Family Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do About It?, CHILD
TRENDS, June 2002, at 6, available at http://www.childtrends.org/files/marriagerb602.pdf).
94. Id. at 162.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 147.
97. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 162–63 (Reavley, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 165 (Southwick, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority should have
concluded its opinion when it determined that the full faith and credit claim could not
be brought under § 1983); id. (Haynes, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the
court should not have reached the equal protection claim).
99. Id. (Reavley, J., concurring); id. (Haynes, J., concurring and dissenting).
100. Id.
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4. Judge Wiener’s Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Wiener disagreed with the majority for
four main reasons: the majority opinion takes away federal courts’
subject matter jurisdiction over full faith and credit claims; it overly
restricts the use of § 1983; it creates a circuit split; and it addresses
and dismisses an equal protection claim that the district court did
not adjudicate.101
Judge Wiener began by criticizing the majority’s reasoning that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied only to state courts and
not to non-judicial state actors.102 He argued that the majority “read
words into the [Full Faith and Credit] Clause that simply are not
there.”103 The dissent reasoned that because the Full Faith and Credit
Clause text did not support the majority’s position, the majority pur-
posefully misconstrued the Court’s decision in Thompson by ignoring
crucial differences between the two cases.104 Thompson involved an
action between two private parties.105 The instant case involved a pri-
vate individual suing a state actor and, as such, Judge Wiener argued
Thompson was not controlling precedent.106
Wiener explained that the Court’s decisions in Dennis and Golden
State laid out the proper framework for addressing the full faith and
credit claims and whether § 1983 is a proper way to redress these
claims.107 After applying both case precedents to the facts of the
instant case, the dissent concluded that § 1983 is “indisputably . . .
an appropriate remedy.”108
Judge Wiener next argued that the Louisiana Registrar did
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause when she refused to issue
a birth certificate with both adoptive parents listed.109 The dissent
elucidated that the majority improperly confused the ideas of “recog-
nition” and “enforcement.”110 By refusing to issue the birth certifi-
cate, the Registrar failed to recognize New York’s judgment and apply
101. Id. at 166–67 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 170 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
103. Smith III, 639 F.3d. at 169 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 170–71 (“The . . . majority’s second misstep, then, is its twisting of . . .
Thompson v. Thompson . . . . The en banc majority errs, therefore, in cherry-picking
passages of Thompson out of context and applying them here, failing all the while to
acknowledge Thompson’s naturally limited holding . . . .” (citing Thompson v. Thompson,
484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988))).
105. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 174.
106. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 171 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 173–74.
108. Id. at 176 (citing Dennis v. Higgens, 498 U.S. 439, 439 (1991); Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 116 (1989)).
109. Id. at 176–77.
110. Id. at 177.
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it to Louisiana’s laws, which constituted an impermissible violation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.111 The dissent maintained that,
by allowing the Registrar to deny the adoptive parents a proper birth
certificate, the majority not only allowed a constitutional violation,
but also created a circuit split.112 The dissent concluded by chastis-
ing the majority for addressing the “very likely winning” equal pro-
tection claim when the district court did not hear that claim.113
II. ANALYSIS
The decision of the divided Fifth Circuit en banc panel raises a
number of questions regarding the proper interpretation of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.114 Despite denying that it had created a
circuit split, the Fifth Circuit issued an en banc decision in direct
conflict with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Finstuen.115 By address-
ing each of the Fifth Circuit’s holdings regarding the Full Faith and
Credit Clause in turn, it should become clear that the Fifth Circuit
misconstrued Supreme Court precedent. First, § 1983 is a proper ve-
hicle for redressing violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Second, denying a revised birth certificate to the adoptive parents
is a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
A. Section 1983 Is a Proper Vehicle to Redress Full Faith and
Credit Claims
The purpose of § 1983 is to provide a “federal remedy for ‘the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.’ ”116 By examining Supreme Court precedent,
the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the implications of
the Fifth Circuit’s holding, it will be demonstrated that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause creates rights that are enforceable through
a § 1983 claim.
111. Id. at 178.
112. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 181 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he en banc
majority superficially dismisses Finstuen v. Crutcher as ‘an outlier to the jurisprudence
of full faith and credit,’ implicitly disrespecting the Tenth Circuit, . . . the State of
Oklahoma and the district court where that case was filed . . . .”).
113. Id. at 166–67.
114. The vote was eleven to five holding that Louisiana did not violate the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, and nine to seven in favor the majority’s decision regarding the equal
protection claim. Id. at 147.
115. Compare id. with Finstuen v. Edmonson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (W.D. Okla. 2006),
aff’d sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2007).
116. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989) (quoting
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2006)).
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In Golden State, the Supreme Court reiterated the factors to be
addressed in determining whether a Constitutional provision or
federal law creates an enforceable right that can be remedied with
a § 1983 claim117 and whether Congress had “specifically foreclosed
a remedy under § 1983.”118 The three factors to determine whether
there is an enforceable right are: first, “whether the provision in ques-
tion creates obligations binding on the governmental unit”; second,
whether the plaintiff’s interest is “ ‘too vague and amorphous’ to be
‘beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce’ ”; and finally,
“whether the provision in question was ‘intend[ed] to benefit’ the
putative plaintiff.”119 An examination of these three factors demon-
strates that the Full Faith and Credit Clause creates a judicially
enforceable right.120
First, the Full Faith and Credit Clause creates a binding obli-
gation on states to recognize the judgments of other states.121 The
Supreme Court has reiterated this obligation on numerous occa-
sions.122 Second, the obligation of states to recognize out-of-state
judgments is not vague; rather, it is a concrete command that courts
have been enforcing for almost two hundred years.123 Third, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause was specifically designed to benefit plain-
tiffs, like the adoptive parents, whose judgment was not being rec-
ognized by another state.124
Furthermore, the Court made it clear in Dennis v. Higgins that
the construction of the Full Faith and Credit Clause suggests that
it should be broadly construed.125 In Dennis, an individual brought
117. Id. at 105–07.
118. Id. at 106 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005, n.9 (1984) (citations
omitted), found superceded by statute in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211
(1995)).
119. Id. (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,
431–32 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)).
120. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 174 (5th Cir. 2011) (Wiener, J., dissenting) (citing
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011); see
also U.S. Brief for Adar as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1 Adar v. Smith, 132
S. Ct. 400 (2011) (No. 11-46), 2011 WL 3584748.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 3 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State.” (emphasis added)).
122. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998); Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979).
123. See, e.g., Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481 (1813); U.S. Brief for Adar as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 5 Adar v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011) (No. 11-46), 2011
WL 3584748.
124. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 174–75 n.44 (citing Thomas v. Wa. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261, 278 n.23 (1980) (“[T]he purpose of [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] was to pre-
serve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and judicial proceedings of one
state by requiring recognition of their validity in other states . . . .”)).
125. Id. at 173 (“ ‘[A] broad construction of § 1983 is compelled by the statutory
language. . . .’ ” (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991))).
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a § 1983 claim under the Commerce Clause, challenging the consti-
tutionality of a Nebraska statute that imposed retaliatory fees on
motor carriers registered in different states.126 The Court rejected
the argument that a § 1983 claim could not be brought for Commerce
Clause violations.127
The Court began its analysis by confirming that the language
of § 1983 should be broadly construed, focusing on the word “any” in
§ 1983 as well as on the Court’s historically broad interpretation of
§ 1983.128 The Court reasoned that the Commerce Clause does more
than allocate power between the state and federal government.129
After applying the three-factor test from Golden State, the Court con-
cluded that the Commerce Clause conferred an individual right be-
cause the plaintiff there was “engaged in interstate commerce” and
fell into the “ ‘zone of interests’ protected by the Commerce Clause.”130
This individual right could be enforced by bringing a § 1983 claim.131
If the dormant Commerce Clause creates a right redressable with
a § 1983 claim, it follows that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
as well, considering the shared purpose behind both clauses.132 The
Full Faith and Credit Clause and Commerce Clause were both includ-
ed in the Constitution to unify the country by restricting the states.133
The language and construction of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause are even more specific than they are in the Commerce
Clause.134 As the dissent in Smith III explained: “In like manner,
the [Full Faith and Credit] Clause expressly limits the power of
states to deny full faith and credit to the judgments of other states.”135
Further, while the Commerce Clause is a grant of authority to Con-
gress to limit the states if it chooses, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
is an express limitation.136 This limitation creates an individual
126. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 441.
127. Id. at 447.
128. Id. at 443 (The Court explained “we have ‘repeatedly held that the coverage of
[§ 1983] must be broadly construed.’ The legislative history also stresses that . . . it should
be ‘liberally and beneficently construed.’ ” (citations omitted)).
129. Id. at 447.
130. Id. at 449.
131. Id. at 451.
132. U.S. Brief for Adar as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2 Adar v. Smith,
132 S. Ct. 400 (2011) (No. 11-46), 2011 WL 3584748.
133. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (explaining that “[t]he
full faith and credit clause like the commerce clause thus became a nationally unifying
force”); Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935).
134. Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
135. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 174 (5th Cir. 2011) (Wiener, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
136. Id.; U.S. Brief for Adar as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Adar v.
Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011) (No. 11-46), 2011 WL 3584748.
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right enforceable under § 1983 using the Court’s reasoning in Dennis
and Golden State.137
The Fifth Circuit in Smith III mistakenly relied on the Court’s
decision in Thompson to hold that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
did not give rise to a “vindicable . . . § 1983 action.”138 The issue in
Thompson was whether, under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA),139 an individual could enforce a child custody order in
federal court.140 The Court held that the PKPA did not confer “an
implied [private] cause of action.”141 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
found it likely that because the PKPA contained a full faith and
credit obligation within its statutory language, the Court would also
find that full faith and credit violations are not addressable with a
§ 1983 claim.142
The Fifth Circuit erred in relying so heavily on Thompson. First,
the Court was analyzing the claim in the context of the PKPA.143
The Court held that Congress did not intend to apply full faith and
credit principles to the enforcement of the PKPA.144 Because the PKPA
was “addressed to States and to state courts,” Congress “did not intend
the federal courts to play the enforcement role.”145 This holding im-
plies that an individual could not bring a § 1983 claim in federal court
for a violation of the PKPA because Congress has specifically provided
a statutory remedy.146 This holding is, therefore, limited to claims
under the PKPA over state court denials of full faith and credit.147
137. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 174–75 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause creates an enforceable right under the dissent’s more narrow
test in Dennis); see also U.S. Brief for Adar as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9,
Adar v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011) (No. 11-46), 2011 WL 3584748 (“Given this common
purpose, it makes sense that both [the Commerce and Full Faith and Credit Clauses]
confer enforceable rights: judicial enforcement of the limits on state authority embodied
in both Clauses is essential to ensure that these provisions achieve their common struc-
tural purpose.”).
138. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 153.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
140. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182 (1988).
141. Id. at 182–83.
142. Id. at 182.
143. Id. at 181.
144. Id. at 174.
145. Id.
146. This is because under the framework laid out in Golden State, the Court looks to
see if Congress “specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.” It appears Congress did
so in the PKPA when it set up a different remedy framework. Golden State Transit Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 116 (1989) (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,
1005, n. 9 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
147. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 164 (5th Cir. 2011) (Southwick, J., concurring) (stating
that the majority opinion was incorrect to rely on Thompson alone to conclude that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause did not give rise to a § 1983 claim: “By referring to a ‘cause
of action,’ the Court [in Thompson] might have been concluding that strictly based on the
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It does not mean that all Full Faith and Credit Clause claims cannot
be brought under § 1983.
The majority opinion in Smith III reads too much into the Court’s
opinion in Thompson, ignoring other crucial differences.148 One im-
portant distinction between these two cases is that a private individ-
ual brought the Thompson claim against another private individual,
and there was no state actor involved.149 Moreover, the Court held
that there was no implied cause of action against a private citizen
in Thompson, but a § 1983 action is an express remedy to a Constitu-
tional violation by a state actor.150 The Court also never mentioned
§ 1983 in the Thompson opinion.151
Despite these distinguishable facts, the majority opinion chose
to use Thompson to hold that under no circumstances can a § 1983
claim arise from the Full Faith and Credit Clause.152 Further, it seems
strange that the majority opinion also did not analyze the decision
under the test laid out by the Court in Golden State. This decision
seems more strange considering the Court had recently applied the
test in Dennis (a decision that came three years after Thompson) to
a Constitutional provision that was similar in purpose and construc-
tion to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.153
Finally, the Fifth Circuit opinion creates far-reaching ramifi-
cations for the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The court began its
analysis by determining that the Full Faith and Credit Clause ap-
plied only to state courts.154 The court further held that, in the un-
derlying claim, the Registrar was a non-judicial state actor.155 The
specific statute there involved and on the Constitution itself, there was not both a per-
sonal right and a remedy for a violation. The Court did not consider Section 1983.” (cita-
tions omitted)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011); see also U. S. Brief for Adar as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18 Adar v. Smith, 132 U.S. 400 (2011) (No. 11-46), 2011
WL 3584748.
148. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 170–71 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson, 484 U.S.
at 174–75).
149. Id. at 171.
150. Id.
151. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174.
152. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 155–56.
153. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 439 (1991) (holding that violations of the
Commerce Clause can give rise to a § 1983 action); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City
of Los Angeles, 439 U.S. 103, 103 (1989) (holding that a § 1983 claim was available
despite extensive regulations); Smith III, 639 F.3d at 164–65 (Southwick, J., concurring)
(“Another reason to treat the old construction of Full Faith and Credit as outdated would
have been [because] . . . the dormant Commerce Clause was found to create individual
rights assertable in the Section 1983 action. The majority analytically relegates Dennis
to a footnote . . . .” (citations omitted)).
154. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 152–53.
155. Id. at 154 (“Consequently, since the duty of affording full faith and credit to a
judgment falls on courts, it is incoherent to speak of vindicating full faith and credit
rights against non-judicial state actors.”).
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court asserted that non-judicial state actors are “unsuited and lack
a structured process for conducting the legal inquiry necessary to
discern whether a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.”156
By denying the plaintiffs a remedy through § 1983, the Fifth
Circuit creates an untenable situation in which a state can deny full
faith and credit to other states’ judgments by simply delegating the
task to non-judicial actors.157 The dissent noted that nearly every state
(including Louisiana) had adopted the Revised Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgment Act, which allows states to delegate the regis-
tering of sister state judgments by non-judicial state officials.158 If,
as the Fifth Circuit contends, the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies
only to state courts, what remedy does a plaintiff have other than a
§ 1983 claim in federal court?159
The Fifth Circuit’s holding leaves an individual with no remedy
to enforce that individual’s valid out-of-state adoption.160 Instead,
the decision allows a state unfettered freedom to delegate judgment
registration to a non-judicial state actor while simultaneously hold-
ing that those non-judicial state actors are not subject to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause requirements.161 Because the purpose of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause is to limit state sovereignty and consti-
tutionally require recognition of sister state judgments, it cannot
possibly follow that states can simply avoid this obligation.162
An examination of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion and the Court’s
jurisprudence concerning § 1983 shows the Smith III holding that
156. Id. at 155.
157. U.S. Brief for Adar as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18 Adar v. Smith
132 S. Ct. 400 (2011) (No. 11-46), 2011 WL 3584748.
The majority itself was plainly uncomfortable with its conclusion that state
executive officials can violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause with im-
punity . . . . But its suggested remedy is flatly inconsistent with its consti-
tutional analysis. If . . . a state executive officer is not subject to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, then recognition of an out-of-state judgment is . . .
a discretionary act . . . . [T]he officer is under no constitutional duty to rec-
ognize the judgment, it is difficult to understand on what ground this Court
could order a state court to supply a remedy. Id.
158. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 171, 182 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (“This blesses Louisiana’s
cynical ploy of having its Registrar and Attorney General do, by executive fiat, that which
the Tenth Circuit ruled Oklahoma’s legislature could not do statutorily.”), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
162. The idea that states can avoid giving full faith and credit to sister state judg-
ments for public policy reasons has been explicitly rejected by the Court. See Baker v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998) (“This Court’s decisions support no roving
‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due judgments.” (citing Estin v. Estin,
334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948))).
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a Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot give rise to a § 1983 claim is
incorrect. Section 1983 is meant to be widely construed, and the Court
has broadly interpreted it to be a valid remedy to a variety of Constitu-
tional violations.163 Under the Golden State test as well as the Court’s
reasoning in Dennis, the Full Faith and Credit Clause confers an in-
dividual right that should be redressable via a § 1983 claim.164 Finally,
the potential consequences of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion demonstrate
its invalidity.
B. Louisiana Violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause by
Refusing to Issue a Revised Birth Certificate
After deciding that the plaintiffs did not have a judiciable claim
under § 1983,165 the Fifth Circuit undertook an analysis of whether
Louisiana’s registrar violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause by
denying a revised birth certificate with both the adoptive parents’
names listed.166 Through questionable reasoning, the Fifth Circuit
held that the Registrar did not violate the Full Faith and Credit
Clause in refusing to issue a revised birth certificate.167
After summarily dismissing the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Fin-
stuen,168 the majority held that forcing the Registrar to issue the
birth certificate would go beyond “recognition” and be “enforcement”
of New York law, which is not required under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.169
In applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Supreme Court
has recognized that there is a distinction between recognition and
enforcement.170 A state is not compelled under full faith and credit
principles to enforce the law of another state,171 but a state must rec-
ognize the sister state’s judgment and then apply the outcome of that
judgment to its own statutory scheme.172 Finally, there is no public
163. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443–45 (1991).
164. Id. at 439–40; Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 439 U.S. 103,
116 (1989).
165. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 146–47 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400
(2011).
166. Id. at 158–61.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 157 (“The bulk of the [Finstuen] opinion is devoted to analysis of the al-
legedly unconstitutional state non-recognition statute, a problem different from the
one here.”).
169. Id. at 160.
170. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Baker v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1998)).
171. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979).
172. Baker, 522 U.S. at 224.
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policy exception.173 A state cannot change or modify its own enforce-
ment scheme to avoid its full faith and credit obligations.174
The Fifth Circuit was incorrect to label the Registrar’s denial of
the birth certificate as a constitutionally allowable denial of the
enforcement of other states’ laws.175 The court reasoned that the
Registrar had recognized the New York adoption decree by offering
to list one parent on the birth certificate.176 The court continued that
the New York decree could only be executed in Louisiana as Louisiana
law allows.177 Because Louisiana law forbids unmarried couples from
adopting children, the birth certificate could not be issued with both
parents’ names.178
The court’s rationale is mistaken and conflicts directly with the
line of reasoning both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have
used.179 The New York court issued a judgment naming the parents
in Smith III the adoptive parents.180 The parents in Smith III there-
fore have the status of the child’s adoptive parents via the New York
judgment.181 As the adoptive parents, Louisiana must apply (recog-
nize) this status (adoptive parents) to its birth certificate law.182
The Fifth Circuit majority used the wrong law when it concluded
that this status had been applied fairly to Louisiana statutes.183 The
judge cited the Louisiana Children’s Code, which prohibits unmar-
ried couples from adopting.184 This Code makes no mention of any
173. Id. at 223.
174. Id. (holding “this Court’s decisions support no roving ‘public policy exception’ to
the full faith and credit due judgments” (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948)));
see also Wasserman, supra note 3, at 23 (stating that states cannot decline to recognize
the judgments of other states).
175. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 159 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 160.
178. Id. at 161.
179. Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611, 611 (1915); Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139,
1139 (10th Cir. 2007). In his dissent, Judge Wiener discusses the problem with the ma-
jority’s reliance on Hood:
[T]he only proper Hood analogy to the instant case would be if New York
law would allow all adoptive parents to obtain revised birth certificates but
Louisiana law would not. In this hypothetical example, Appellees would not
be entitled to a revised Louisiana birth certificate simply because of the
New York law . . . . But . . . . [h]ere, the Registrar is not refusing to apply
New York birth certificate law; she is refusing to “accept” the New York
adoption decree and recognize the corresponding status determination for
purposes of Louisiana’s birth certificate law.
Smith III, 639 F.3d at 178 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
180. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 149.
181. Id. at 159.
182. Id. at 178 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 177.
184. Id. at 161 (citing LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (1992)).
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rules or regulations concerning the issuance of Louisiana birth cer-
tificates.185 The plaintiffs had requested the birth certificate from
the Registrar under Louisiana birth certificate law codified in the
Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated, which is separate from the
Louisiana Children’s Code.186 The Louisiana birth certificate law
requires the State Registrar, upon receipt of a valid out-of-state adop-
tion decree, to issue a Louisiana birth certificate listing both of the
adoptive parents.187 To give full faith and credit to the parents’ New
York judgment, Louisiana must apply the couple’s status as the
adoptive parents under the applicable law (in this case the birth cer-
tificate law). Because Louisiana law orders the Registrar to list both
names of the adoptive parents on the birth certificate, and the cou-
ple has been adjudged to be the adoptive parents, the Registrar can-
not simply refuse.188
By refusing to issue the revised birth certificate, the Registrar is
not equally applying Louisiana law.189 The Court declared that there
is no public policy exception in the Full Faith and Credit Clause.190
Louisiana cannot use its public policy concerns regarding adoptions
by same-sex couples to selectively exclude the recognition of out-of-
state judgments.191 But this is exactly what the Registrar did in this
instance; she refused to issue the birth certificate based on Louisiana’s
public policy concerns.192 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wiener cor-
rectly asserted that “[t]he real problem is that Louisiana is refusing
rights created by its own law, but only to a subset of valid out-of-state
adoptions.”193 This type of discretion from a state actor is the antith-
esis of the evenhanded application requirement under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.194
If the majority in Smith III is correct, it is difficult to imagine
what the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require. The outcome
of the majority argument is that the Registrar has given valid
185. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (1992).
186. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76 (2011); Smith III, 639 F.3d at 149.
187. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76 (2011).
188. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 179–80.
189. Id. at 180 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Registrar’s actual policy is to issue new
birth certificates containing the names of every adoptive parent for some out-of-state
adoptions but not for others . . . . As such, the Registrar’s pick-and-choose recognition
policy violates the FF&C Clause.”).
190. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998).
191. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 177 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (“[The Registrar] has refused
to recognize Appellees’ nationwide, lawful status as ‘adoptive parents’ by denying them
the ‘adoptive parent’ rights created in Louisiana’s birth certificate (not adoption) statute.”).
192. Id. at 149–50.
193. Id. at 178 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
194. Id.
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recognition to New York’s judgment simply by conceding that the
parents are the adoptive parents, even if the Registrar refuses to
treat the parents as adoptive parents under Louisiana law.195
Through an analysis of the majority opinion and the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the meaning and distinction be-
tween recognition and enforcement, it becomes clear that the ma-
jority opinion is incorrect in concluding that the Registrar did not
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Registrar must rec-
ognize the adoption judgment of the New York court. Offering to
list one parent on the birth certificate when the applicable Lou-
isiana law specifically states that both parents must be listed is
not recognition.196
The majority opinion confuses the issue by discussing Louisiana
adoption law and its prohibition of joint adoption by unmarried
couples while ignoring the plain language of the applicable birth
certificate law.197 Furthermore, the Registrar’s refusal to issue the
birth certificate because the couple is same-sex is an unequal appli-
cation of Louisiana law.198 Finally, if the majority were correct, a
state would be able to avoid its full faith and credit obligations by
delegating administrative duties to a non-judicial state actor.199 In
doing so, non-judicial state actors would be able to use their dis-
cretion to arbitrarily refuse out-of-state judgments based on public
policy concerns.200 Not only would this be an alarming constitutional
end-around, but it would also be contrary to a long line of Supreme
Court precedent.201
CONCLUSION
On October 11, 2011, the Supreme Court denied the appellants
writ of certiorari.202 With no clear standard, the Supreme Court
leaves same-sex couples at the mercy of the individual states.203 This
is a frightening prospect to same-sex couples with adopted children,
especially considering the hostility that many states still show
195. Id. at 180.
196. Id. at 168.
197. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 177.
198. Id. at 178.
199. See id. at 172.
200. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
202. Adar v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400, 400 (2011).
203. See Wasserman, supra note 3, at 32–33 (elaborating on the potential dangers
same-sex couples face when they cross state borders with their adopted children).
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towards same-sex couples.204 With the Tenth Circuit’s holding in
Finstuen v. Crutcher, it temporarily appeared that same-sex couples
with adopted children had some degree of certainty concerning the
recognition of their adoptive parents status by other states.205 This
momentary security was significantly reduced after the Fifth Circuit’s
en banc decision in Adar v. Smith.206
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Finstuen v. Crutcher requires
states to give full faith and credit and thus recognize the adoption
decrees of other states.207 This recognition requires that a state ap-
ply the a same-sex couple’s status equally under the relevant statu-
tory framework and issue a birth certificate listing both parents if
statutorily required.208
In the Fifth Circuit, the Adar decision also held that a state
must recognize the adoption decrees of other states under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.209 However, the Fifth Circuit held that
applying a same-sex couple’s status as adoptive parents under the
state’s statutory framework to force a Registrar to issue a revised
birth certificate listing both adoptive parents in a same-sex couple
is unconstitutional enforcement.210 Further, the majority concluded
that a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot be re-
dressed with a claim under § 1983, and a full faith and credit claim
cannot be brought against a non-judicial state actor.211
As this Note demonstrates, the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision
is incorrect and confuses the difference between recognition and en-
forcement. The majority incorrectly relied on the Court’s decision in
Thompson to hold that a full faith and credit claim could not be
brought under § 1983.212 In doing so, the majority ignored the spe-
cific framework that the Court laid out in Golden State and applied
broadly in Dennis.213
Without the availability of § 1983 against non-judicial state
actors, a state can avoid giving full faith and credit to judgments
with which it disagrees by simply delegating the administration of
the judgment to a non-judicial state actor. The Fifth Circuit’s holding
204. See id. at 10–12.
205. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
206. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 147 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
207. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1156.
208. Id. at 1141.
209. Smith III, 639 F.3d at 180 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 152.
211. Id. at 151–52, 154.
212. Id. at 156.
213. See Dennis v. Higgins, 489 U.S. 439, 443 (1991); Golden State Transit Corp. v.
City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106–07 (1989).
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leaves an individual with a valid out-of-state adoption decree no
remedy if a state refuses to recognize their status as an adoptive
parent. This contradicts the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause: to encourage unity between states and limit a state’s ability
to arbitrarily refuse valid judgments.214 By ignoring the applicable
precedent and reading conclusions into previous Court decisions
that simply are not there, the Fifth Circuit has not only created a
circuit split but has endangered the constitutional rights of same-
sex couples and their adopted children.
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